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ABSTRACT 
 
Wage Dispersion and Wage Dynamics Within and Across Firms
*
 
This paper examines wage dispersion and wage dynamics in a stock-flow matching economy 
with on-the-job search. Under stock-flow matching, job seekers immediately become fully 
informed about the stock of viable vacancies. If only one option is available, monopsony 
wages result. With more than one firm bidding, Bertrand wages arise. The initial and 
expected threat of competition determines the evolution of wages and thereby introduces a 
novel way of understanding wage differences among similar workers. The resulting wage 
distribution has an interior mode and prominent, well-behaved tails. The model also 
generates job-to-job transitions with both wage cuts and jumps. 
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Competition determines wages and prices. In models of frictionless markets where competi-
tion is most ﬁerce, the outcome is straightforward. The law of one price holds. As Mortensen
(2003) and others point out, this result is completely at odds with overwhelming empirical
evidence. Similar goods and similar workers are simply not paid the same price and the
same wage.
In models of markets with search, however, matching frictions limit the extent of com-
petition. Several studies have shown that this restriction can generate equilibrium price
dispersion for identical goods and wage dispersion among similar workers. The Burdett and
Mortensen (1998) model, the benchmark of this approach in the labour market, directly
links wage dispersion to the determinants of labour turnover and wage mobility. Job and
worker ﬂows along with wage dispersion thus become key phenomena in making the search
framework relevant for labour market analysis.
Although the search literature claims numerous insights and successes, some empirical
ﬁndings remain elusive and diﬃcult to reconcile. In particular, the benchmark model predicts
that the density distribution function for wages is upward sloping, that there are no job-to-job
transitions with wage cuts, wages do not increase without outside oﬀers. These predictions
are in stark contrast with observed behaviour.
The objective of this paper is to demonstrate that these and other inconsistencies may
stem from the underlying speciﬁcation of search frictions rather than from the general search
approach. The conventional approach posits a ‘black-box’ random matching function to
approximate search frictions. This paper adopts an alternative approach, the stock-ﬂow
methodology, which oﬀers not only a more rigorous and plausible microfoundation for search
frictions but also a more empirically valid picture of matching dynamics.1
In a labour market with stock-ﬂow matching, when a seller, i.e. a worker, goes on the
market in search of a partner, he or she immediately becomes fully informed about the
number of suitable buyers in the stock, i.e. the stock of job vacancies. If lucky, the worker
ﬁnds several viable options. If the worker is unlucky, the market turns up few or possibly
no viable opportunities. In the event that no acceptable vacancies exist in the marketplace,
the worker must wait to match from the ﬂow of new jobs.
Consider wage determination in this set-up with on-the-job search.2 After job search
reveals the number of currently available jobs, all suitable ﬁrms bid for the worker’s services.
If only one option is currently available, the ﬁrm oﬀers a monopsony payoﬀ that claims all
of the gains to trade for the ﬁrm. On the other hand, with more than one ﬁrm involved,
competitive Bertrand bidding occurs. This time, the worker extracts the gains to trade.
1The matching framework used here is most closely related to the matching models of Taylor (1995),
Coles (1999) and Lagos (2000). Emerging empirical evidence indicates this framework has more validity
than random matching. See Coles and Smith (1998), Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001), Andrews, Bradley
and Upward, (2001), Gregg and Petrongolo (2005), Coles and Petrongolo, (2008), Kuo and Smith (2009).
2Taylor (1995) and Coles and Muthoo (1998) examine wages in this set-up without on-the-job search.
2At the outset of the employment relationship, wage dispersion obtains and depends on the
number of competitive bidders found at that time.
Now suppose that at any time after a ﬁrm and worker pair up, the ﬁrm can update its
oﬀer. In other words, a new wage is oﬀered in each instant. The worker can either accept
the latest oﬀer or go again to the market to elicit bids. The ﬁrm updates its wage oﬀer
knowing that as time proceeds, ﬁrms come and go and the number of prospective bidders in
the market evolves randomly. The birth and death of job opportunities generate turnover
but the worker and the employer do not directly observe this turnover unless the worker
actively engages in on-the-job search. The worker must physically visit the market to learn
the actual number of bidders.
This process provides a new source of wage progression with tenure at a ﬁrm. Employers
who want to avoid bidding with the (anticipated) ﬁrms in the market can keep the worker
away from the market with a suﬃciently high wage oﬀer. Such an oﬀer outbids the evolving
threat of on-the-job search, not the actual ﬁrms.
No-search wages face two countervailing forces from turnover in the market. Previous
bidders gradually leave the market and new options enter the market. Outside options
therefore can rise or fall depending on this birth and death process. Wages not only diﬀer
at the outset, they also evolve in diﬀerent patterns. For monopsony wages, the unfortunate
history (from the worker’s perspective) fades and the outside option improves. Low initial
wages rise over time. For competitively bid wages, the more favorable history that led to
high initial wages fades and eventually a less attractive expectation of the number of new
ﬁrms matters more. Although wages start at diﬀerent points and evolve in diﬀerent patterns,
they ultimately converge with long tenures.
Job availability and turnover jointly determine wage dispersion and wage dynamics. Cou-
pled with the mechanics of job search presented here, these factors also lead to job-to-job
transitions with wage cuts and wage rises. Worker job search follows the forced dissolution
of a match. The probability of ﬁnding a suitable bidder depends on the most recent number
of bidders and the duration of the previous match. For many separated workers, especially
with those who had short tenures and many previous bidders, there is a high probability of
ﬁnding at least one match. When a vacancy is available, a job-to-job transition takes place
since all information is immediately revealed and acted upon. The wage at this new job will
again depend on the realized number of bidders. For some, the realization will exceed the
expectations that were pinning down the wage at dismissal. Wages in the new job will rise
above the old wage. For others, the realization will be below the anticipated value and the
new wages in the job-to-job transition will involve a wage cut. This feature of the model ﬁts
recent evidence on wages in job-to-job transitions and the importance of reallocation shocks
in explaining labour turnover. See, for example, Christensen, Lentz, Mortensen, Neumann,
and Werwatz (2005), Jolivet, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006) and Nagypal (2008).
Note as well that some workers who lose their jobs are unlucky and do not ﬁnd a new
3employer immediately. These workers become unemployed and must wait for new opportu-
nities to arise. Since jobs arrive slowly, monopsony wages follow unemployment. Finding no
or only one employment opportunity is most likely for those workers who had short spells
of employment with employers who were paying monopsony wages. In other words, workers
with the lowest pay are prone to unemployment and wage cuts when a new job is found.
Unemployment can thus exhibit state dependence with workers seemingly trapped in low
pay - no pay doldrums not due to their abilities but due to their history of ﬁnding it diﬃcult
to locate suitable employment. This feature of the model is consistent with recent evidence
on the joint wage and employment dynamics of low pay workers. See Stewart (2008).
Initial wages and their subsequent progression within a ﬁrm combine to create a distri-
bution of wages at a point in time. Although it is diﬃcult to formulate and evaluate an
explicit expression for the distribution, numerical methods reveal sensible shapes for a range
of parameters. In a homogeneous environment, the cross section of wages is dispersed around
an interior mode with prominent tails on both sides. Skewness exists but varies left or right
with the underlying fundamentals of the model. The model can also generate reasonable
mean-min ratios and thus overcoming the lack of frictional wage dispersion found in standard
search models by Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2007).
The next section describes the general framework and the process governing vacancy
turnover. Sections 3 and 4 analyze the worker’s and ﬁrm’s problem and solve for optimal
wages. Section 5 and 6 derive wage and employment dynamics. Sections 7 and 8 describe the
steady state distribution of wages for homogeneous and heterogeneous workers respectively.
Section 9 compares our results with standard sequential search models. The last section
concludes.
2 Stock-Flow Dynamics
Consider a continuous time economy with a mass of segregated markets containing homo-
geneous workers and ﬁrms.3 Both agents are risk neutral, discount the future at rate r > 0
and maximize expected lifetime payoﬀs.
From time to time, ﬁrms enter (via a Poisson process) a given market with a project that
produces output using a constant returns to scale technology. Let λdt denote the number
of ﬁrms that enter a market over a time interval of length dt. In all projects, any worker
generates a constant ﬂow revenue x per unit of time.
A worker’s life is tied to the existence of their particular market. A new market opens
with all workers present and exists for exponentially distributed duration with parameter µ.
To maintain a constant number of markets, a proportion µdt are created each period. While
the given market exists, a worker is either employed or unemployed at any point in time.
3Unlike standard matching models (e.g. Pissarides, 2001) we do not endogenize the number of va-
cancy/ﬁrms in the economy. In our framework the number of ﬁrms is ﬁxed ex-ante as in Burdett and
Mortensen (1998).
4Unemployed workers receive payoﬀ b < x per unit of time. Wages of employed workers are
described below.
Given the production technology, a ﬁrm is willing to hire as many workers as it ﬁnds
productive for any given project. Workers do not interfere with each other within the ﬁrm or
in the market.4 The worker simply cares about the arrival rate of employment opportunities.
As a result, it is suﬃcient to analyze the decisions and outcomes of a representative worker
in each market.
Workers ﬁnd out about the existence of new projects in their market through search.
Following the stock-ﬂow matching approach (see Coles and Smith, 1998), information about
the availability of buyers (ﬁrms) and sellers (workers) in a given market is centralized in a
job centre. A ﬁrm posts project requirements as vacancies at the job centre as soon as they
occur and maintain this listing until the project terminates.
Workers check the posted list from time to time. When the worker checks the list of posted
vacancies, there are no frictions or delays in processing the information. All information
regarding the viability of a position is immediately made clear and common knowledge. As
such, there are no impediments to exchange after the worker ﬁnds out about the existence
of gains to trade at the job centre.
Given the worker pays a search cost c > 0, he or she enters the job centre and imme-
diately observes the number of vacancies in the market. A complete information auction
for the worker’s services follows given the number of viable job opportunities. Consider an
unemployed worker. Three relevant cases can arise in this setting:
• No viable vacancies are posted in which case the worker remains unemployed and
chooses another date to re-visit the job centre.
• Only one viable vacancy is available in which case the ﬁrm is a monopsonist for this
particular worker and does not face competition in the auction. The ﬁrm then makes
a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the worker such that it extracts the entire gains to trade
thereby making the worker indiﬀerent between employment and unemployment.
• Two or more vacancies are viable in which case the ﬁrms competitively bid against
each other for the worker. Bertrand bidding implies that the worker captures the
entire gains to trade.
During employment, the worker can decide to re-visit the job centre in search of a better
oﬀer. If on-the-job search occurs, the outcome is common knowledge - both the worker and
the ﬁrm become informed about the number of available employment opportunities for the
worker in the job centre.5 Given the number of viable opportunities found in the job centre,
4See Coles (1999) for an analysis of congestion externalities in a model of stock-ﬂow matching.
5Common knowledge rules out the possibility that a worker visits the job centre and calls for an auction
only if conditions are favorable. As demonstrated below the ﬁrm can infer worker behavior from its wage
oﬀer.
5a new auction occurs. The new or re-negotiated wage depends on the number of vacancies
in the job centre at that moment.
The worker may also visit the job centre following a job separation. A match may end
from (endogenously induced) job search or due to an exogenous job destruction shock, which
follows a Poisson process with rate δ. In what follows matched pairs will break up only due
to exogenous separation shocks. Moreover, for analytical tractability we assume that job
destruction occurs when a ﬁrm withdraws its vacancies from the job centre.
2.1 Vacancy Turnover
Let t ≥ 0 denote the duration since the worker last visited the job centre. Suppose at this
last visit, the worker left behind k ≥ 0 job opportunities. More speciﬁcally, if the worker
came away from this visit to the job centre either unemployed or hired monopsonistically,
then k = 0. If a competitive auction occurred (an auction with more than one bidder), there
were k + 1 bidders and k ≥ 1. One bidder won the auction and the other k remain behind.
Note that when a market opens, the worker has no history and no ﬁrm has arrived yet so
that t = k = 0.
Given k, the probability of ﬁnding n ≥ 0 projects or vacancies after a duration t since
the last visit to the job centre follows from queuing theory. In particular, this probability
can be obtained from the combination of two random variables:6
• RV 1 : The number of vacancies that survive until time t, given the number of vacancies
that were left in the job centre at the time of last visit.
• RV 2 : The number of new and un-sampled vacancies in the job centre at time t, given
an entry and exit process of job opportunities.
Since δ describes the rate at which vacancies in the job centre are destroyed, the properties
of the Poisson process imply that RV 1 follows a Binomial distribution with parameters
￿
k,e−δt￿
, where e−δt is the probability that a vacancy has not left the job centre by time
t. From the forward Kolmogorov diﬀerential equations describing this birth-death process,7
RV 2 has a Poisson distribution with parameter
φ(t) =
λ
δ
(1 − e
−δt).
As RV 1 and RV 2 are independently distributed, the probability density of their sum is
given by the convolution of their respective density functions. Hence, the probability that
there are n ≥ 0 vacancies at time t ≥ 0, given k ≥ 0 vacancies were in the job centre at the
6For details see Prabhu (1965).
7For a derivation see Lemma 1 in Smith (2007).
6time of last visit is described by
Pn(t,k) =
min{k,n} X
i=0
￿
k
i
￿
(e
−δt)
i(1 − e
−δt)
k−i
￿
φ(t)n−ie−φ(t)
(n − i)!
￿
, (1)
where the min{.} operator applies since the convolution is not deﬁned for negative factorials.
Moreover, as t → ∞ each of these transition probabilities converge to a unique value
Pn =
￿
λ
δ
￿n e− λ
δ
n!
, (2)
that is independent of k. The ergodic distribution of n has mean and variance equal to λ/δ.
3 Worker Payoﬀs
Worker payoﬀs critically depend on the timing and expectations of events in the job centre.
Let E(t,k) represent the expected utility of an employed worker given spell length t and job
opportunities k as described above. Suppose this worker decided to visit the job centre. Once
there, the worker calls an auction and compares the resulting payoﬀ to that of unemployment.
In the latter case the worker may revisit the job centre at a later stage knowing that at the
time of the last visit there were k + 1 vacancies available. Let U(t,k) denote the expected
value of unemployment having observed k vacancies in the job centre t periods ago. Since
visiting the job centre at any point in time resets t to zero, the expected payoﬀ to on-the-job
search for a worker with pair t,k is thus given by
W(t,k) = −c +
∞ X
i=0
Pi(t,k)max{E(0,i),U(0,i + 1)}.
On the other hand, if a worker with pair t,k experienced a separation shock and decided to
visit the job centre immediately, the expected payoﬀ of search is instead given by
V (t,k) = −c + P0(t;k)U(0,0) +
∞ X
i=1
Pi(t,k)max{E(0,i − 1),U(0,i)}.
Note that the diﬀerence between W and V arises since the current job of an employed worker
is always available as a fall back option.
To focus on the employment relationship the following analysis adopts the limiting case
in which c → 0. This assumption is useful as it implies that workers visit the job centre
immediately after an exogenous job separation. Moreover, in this limiting case any unem-
ployed worker revisits the job centre every period and the expected value of unemployment
7given that the worker can call an auction with i bidders is then given by
(r + µ)U(0,i) = b + λ[max{E(0,i),U(0,i + 1)} − U(0,i)] − iδ[U(0,i) − U(0,i − 1)], (3)
for all i ≥ 0.
Now consider an employed worker that visited the job centre t periods ago and observed
k + 1 vacancies such that he/she is currently oﬀered a wage w(t,k). Suppose this worker
decides not to search this instant. As c → 0, it follows that
E(t,k) = w(t,k)dt+
1 − µdt
1 + rdt
[δdtV (t + dt,k) + (1 − δdt)max{E(t + dt,k),W(t + dt,k)}]+O(dt
2).
Moreover, if the worker also decides to forgo search in the next instant, E(t + dt,k) ≥
W(t + dt,k), we get
(r + µ)E(t,k) = w(t,k) + ˙ E(t,k) − δ[E(t,k) − V (t,k)]. (4)
The ﬁrm can oﬀer a suﬃciently high wage such that E(t,k) ≥ W(t,k) and the worker
chooses or is eﬀectively bribed not to visit the job centre at time t. If it chooses to go
this way, the ﬁrm would optimally oﬀer the lowest possible wage that satisﬁes this criteria.
Hence, given t,k a worker’s no-search wage implies
E(t,k) = W(t,k).
We now characterize the wage the worker demands in order not to search and not visit the
job centre, denoted as ww(t,k), and then subsequently consider whether the ﬁrm is willing
to oﬀer this wage.
3.1 Initial Payoﬀs
As search resets t, the ﬁrst step is to characterize the value functions at zero durations. If
an employer is met during a visit to the job centre, any ensuing employment will not have
zero spell length. The worker does not expect discrete changes in market options - prospects
do not change quickly enough - so that from (4)
(r + µ)E(0,k) = w
w(0,k) + ˙ E(0,k) − δ[E(0,k) − V (0,k)].
If the ﬁrm ﬁnds itself in an auction for the worker, the winning bid will make the worker
indiﬀerent between accepting and the next best alternative. When the ﬁrm is the only
bidder for the worker, the ﬁrm only needs to entice the worker out of unemployment. When
more than one ﬁrm bids for the worker, the winning bid entices the worker away from the
competition. Noting that once employed the worker does not loose the option of calling an
auction once again and that x > b, it follows that E(0,k) ≥ U(0,k + 1) for all k. Using
8E(t,k) = W(t,k) and noting that the above payoﬀs then imply V (0,k) = E(0,k − 1) when
k ≥ 1, E(0,k) can be described by
(r + µ)E(0,k) = w
w(0,k) +
∞ X
i=0
˙ Pi(0,k)E(0,i) − δ[E(0,k) − E(0,k − 1)], (5)
for all k ≥ 1.
After a visit to the job centre, all information is revealed and the distribution of available
ﬁrms is degenerate at k. The birth and death process of potential jobs at that instant involves
a one step instantaneous transition such that ˙ Pi(0,k) = 0 for all i / ∈ {k − 1,k,k + 1}. By
diﬀerentiating (1) with respect to t, we obtain that ˙ Pk−1(0,k) = δk, ˙ Pk(0,k) = −δk −λ and
˙ Pk+1(0,k) = λ, which greatly simpliﬁes (5). Conditional on starting wages, ww(0,k), initial
payoﬀs are described by the following recursive system of second order diﬀerence equations:
(r + µ)U(0,0) = b + λ[E(0,0) − U(0,0)], (6)
(r + µ)E(0,0) = w
w(0,0) + λ[E(0,1) − E(0,0)] − δ[E(0,0) − U(0,0)], (7)
(r + µ)E(0,k) = w
w(0,k) + λ[E(0,k + 1) − E(0,k)] − δ(k + 1)[E(0,k) − E(0,k − 1)] (8)
for k ≥ 1, where the equation for U(0,0) follows from (3). The boundary condition is that
a worker with many ﬁrms gets productivity payments indeﬁnitely:
lim
k→∞
(r + µ)E(0,k) = w
w(0,∞) = x. (9)
3.2 Worker’s No-Search Wages
Substituting the expressions for W(t,k) and V (t,k) into E(t,k) and solving for ww(t,k)
gives the following no-search wages for all (t,k),
w
w(t,k) =
∞ X
i=0
[(r + µ + δ)Pi(t,k) − ˙ Pi(t,k) − δPi+1(t,k)]E(0,i) − δP0(t,k)U(0,0), (10)
where equation (1) describes Pi(t,k) and equations (6)-(9) describe E(0,k) and U(0,0).
Hence, given starting wages ww(0,k), ww(t,k) is completely characterised by (10) for all t,k.
4 Firm Payoﬀs
A wage oﬀer below the no-search threshold ww(t,k) triggers a visit to the job centre where
all information is revealed. If the worker searches and ﬁnds another potential employer, the
ﬁrm ﬁnds itself competing in an auction where it can revise its oﬀer. In this case the worker
captures the entire expected payoﬀ to matching. If the worker does not ﬁnd another ﬁrm,
the worker accepts the existing employer’s oﬀer provided it is preferred to unemployment.
9For this reason, should the current ﬁrm oﬀer a search inducing wage, the ﬁrm needs to only
oﬀer a wage that makes the worker as well oﬀ as unemployed, that is ww(0,0). If this wage is
accepted, the ﬁrm captures the match beneﬁts. To assess whether the risks of re-negotiation
following the worker’s visit to the job centre are worth the reward, we now consider the wage
that the ﬁrm is willing to pay to avoid uncertainty and keep the worker from engaging in
on-the-job search.
Let Π(t,k) denote the ﬁrm’s continuation payoﬀ given spell length t and job opportunities
k from employing a worker who does not search on the job. The payoﬀ to inducing the worker
to visit the job centre is then given by the expectation of job opportunities, knowing that
the ﬁrm is always available as a fall back option:
S(t,k) =
∞ X
i=0
Pi(t,k)Π(0,i).
Since a competitive auction implies the worker obtains all the gains to trade, Π(0,k) = 0 for
k ≥ 1. The expected value of inducing the worker to search therefore reduces to
S(t,k) = P0(t,k)Π(0,0).
That is, the expected payoﬀ of inducing the worker to search is given by the ﬁrm’s chances
of not encountering competition and oﬀering the monopsony wage ww(0,0).
To derive a ﬁrm’s continuation payoﬀ recall that when a δ-shock arrives the job is de-
stroyed and the ﬁrm obtains zero proﬁts. Further, when a worker receives a µ-shock and
leaves the labour market the ﬁrm obtains zero proﬁts for this worker’s job.8 Standard dy-
namic programming arguments then imply if the worker accepts the wage w(t,k) then
Π(t,k) = [x − w(t,k)]dt +
1 − µdt
1 + rdt
[(1 − δdt)max{Π(t + dt,k),S(t + dt,k)}] + O(dt
2),
Provided Π(t + dt,k) ≥ S(t + dt,k) and letting dt → 0, Π(t,k) is described by
(r + µ + δ)Π(t,k) = x − w(t,k) + ˙ Π(t,k)
for all k,t ≥ 0.
4.1 Firm’s No-Search Wages
As discussed above, ﬁrms oﬀer one of only two wages at each point in time. Either the ﬁrm
pays the lowest wage such that the worker prefers not to go on the market and search for
other competing ﬁrms or the current ﬁrm risks job search and oﬀers the lowest possible wage
8This occurs in the sequential search literature. Moreover, this outcome is consistent with the free entry
condition for vacancy creation found in matching models in which the expected value of a vacancy is equal
to zero.
10that the worker is willing to accept. Letting Π(t,k) = S(t,k) gives the wage that makes a
ﬁrm indiﬀerent from keeping the worker or inducing him to search:
w
f(t,k) = x −
h
(r + µ + δ)P0(t,k) − ˙ P0(t,k)
i
Π(0,0) (11)
for all k,t ≥ 0. For the ﬁrm to actually make this (or some lower wage oﬀer), it must be the
case that the worker decides not to search at the oﬀered wage. What the ﬁrm is willing to
pay in equation (11) must be suﬃcient to keep the worker away from search as described in
(10), that is ww(t,k) ≤ wf(t,k). Otherwise, the ﬁrm prefers to induce the worker to search.
Let Z(0,i) denote the sum of worker and ﬁrm expected payoﬀs in a match when search
occurs and the worker leaves i = n − 1 unmatched viable opportunities in the job centre
at the moment of the pairing. Deﬁne expected combined payoﬀs in the next worker-ﬁrm
pairing at t by
¯ Z(t,k) = EiZ(0,i) =
∞ X
i=0
[E(0,i) + Π(0,i)]Pi(t,k).
If a visit to the job centre takes place, any ﬁrm existing in the market, including the
current ﬁrm, can wind up with the worker in the auction occurring after search, that is in
the next match. As the current ﬁrm can always re-hire the worker for any given k (recall
ﬁrms are homogeneous), the expected gains to trade with the current ﬁrm immediately after
search must equal the expected gains to trade with any other ﬁrm in the market.
Given there is a positive cost of visiting the job centre, it is eﬃcient for the worker
and the ﬁrm to save the search cost and split ¯ Z(t,k) within the current employment match
at any given t. As c → 0, these match speciﬁc rents dissipate and ¯ Z(t,k) also comes to
equal the expected payoﬀs in a match before search. Moreover, at wf(t,k) the worker is by
construction receiving
¯ Z(t,k) − S(t,k) = ¯ Z(t,k) − P0(t,k)Π(0,0)
in the current match. Since ¯ Z(t,k) − P0(t,k)Π(0,0) describes the worker’s expected pay-
oﬀ from search, he is indiﬀerent between search and accepting wf(t,k). Hence, we have
established the following result.
Proposition 1: ww(t,k) = wf(t,k) for all t and k.
In this economy, on-the-job search is a wasteful, rent seeking activity. Once a match is
formed, search does not generate any further gains to trade or match speciﬁc rents. The
participation constraints of both agents bind at the same wage. The market does not fun-
damentally change when the worker visits the job centre. There are no new opportunities
generated by a visit - existing opportunities are merely realized. Search does not change the
expected gains to trade at any given point in time, it just reallocates the division of these
beneﬁts. Since workers and ﬁrms share the same risk neutral, intratemporal preferences, and
since all ﬁrms are identical, there is no potential role for meaningful on-the-job search.
115 Within Firm Wage Dynamics
Given Proposition 1, we can circumvent directly solving the system of equations describing
E(0,k) and U(0,0) in (10) and instead simply look at wage dynamics and wage distributions
using (11). We start by analyzing how wages evolve within a ﬁrm for any given k.
A ﬁrm that does not face any competition in the job centre oﬀers the worker an expected
payoﬀ E(0,0) = U(0,1) such that it makes the worker indiﬀerent from accepting employment
or staying unemployed. The ﬁrm extracts the entire gains from the match. Using (11), (7)
and (3) it follows that with such an oﬀer the ﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ
Π(0,0) =
x − b
r + µ + δ + λ
.
The ﬁrm obtains the present value of the gains from forming a match, appropriately dis-
counted by the interest rate, the rate at which jobs are destroyed and the rate at which the
ﬁrm stops being a monopsonist in the job centre. From equation (1), we also obtain
P0(t,k) = (1 − e
−δt)
ke
−φ(t) =
￿
δ
λ
￿k
φ(t)
ke
−φ(t)
˙ P0(t,k) = P0(t,k)
φ′(t)
φ(t)
[k − φ(t)]. (12)
Substituting out these expressions in (11) gives the set of wages that makes the worker and
ﬁrm indiﬀerent from visiting the job centre for all t,k:
w(t,k) = x −
￿
δ
λ
￿k
φ(t)
ke
−φ(t)
￿
(r + µ + δ) −
φ′(t)
φ(t)
[k − φ(t)]
￿
x − b
r + µ + δ + λ
. (13)
In the absence of voluntary quits or layoﬀs, t also denotes the elapsed time since the
match was formed whereas equation (13) describes the wages ﬁrms pay their workers over
this duration given that there were k other ﬁrms at the hiring stage competing for the worker.
At any time t, wages are inversely related to the probability the current employer is
the only one that can use the worker’s services and positively related to the change of this
probability during the next instant. The worker is prepared to accept a lower wage and
avoid re-negotiating the terms of employment when there is a higher probability that the
employer can become a monopsonist. However, if this probability is higher in the next
instant, ceteris paribus, the ﬁrm prefers a visit to the job centre to take place during the
next instant rather than during the current one. In this case, the worker requires a higher
wage today in compensation for any potential loss. Although Proposition 1 guarantees no
voluntary visits to the job centre take place, optimal no-search wages at any t for any given
k are determined by the trade-oﬀ between these two opposing eﬀects.
125.1 Initial wages
When a separation shock occurs, the current job ends, the worker re-visits the job centre
and observes n available job opportunities with probability Pn(t,k). If the worker does not
ﬁnd at least one viable job opportunity in the job centre (n = 0), unemployment occurs,
and the worker gets payoﬀ U(0,0). If an employment opportunity exists (n ≥ 1), the worker
immediately becomes employed with wages given by w(0,n − 1).
If the worker ﬁnds exactly one job opportunity, he or she immediately takes it and gets
payoﬀ E(0,0). The ﬁrm oﬀers the minimum amount necessary to entice the worker into
employment. Equating (3) and (7) the starting wage oﬀered by the ﬁrm is
w(0,0) = b.
Since the worker does not loose the option of calling an auction once employed and job
destruction occurs at the same rate as vacancies leave the job centre, E(0,0) = U(0,1)
implies the ﬁrm needs to oﬀer a starting wage of b to employ the worker.
Some displaced workers will be fortunate and ﬁnd that more than one job have accumu-
lated in the market. If the worker ﬁnds exactly two job opportunities, n = 2, the starting
wage is
w(0,1) = x + δ
x − b
r + µ + δ + λ
,
while for n ≥ 3, the starting wages are
w(0,n − 1) = x.
Interestingly, w(0,1) > w(0,k) for k ≥ 2. Immediately after the worker is employed and
k ﬁrms are left behind, only two events can happen in the job centre. One of the sampled
vacancies is destroyed or a new vacancy arrives. Suppose n = 2 so that k = 1. The current
employer becomes a would-be monopsonist in the next instant of duration dt with probability
δdt. In this case, inducing the worker to visit the job centre, the employer obtains Π(0,0)
whereas the worker gets U(0,1). The worker extracts this potential loss at the start of the
employment relationship in the form of an initial wage above productivity.
In contrast, when k = n − 1 ≥ 2, there is no threat that the employer could be a
monopsonist immediately after employment begins. If one of the vacancies left behind is
destroyed, the current employer does not improve its prospects of being a monopsonist. In
the immediate instant after hiring, with probability one there is at least one other vacancy
willing to compete for the worker. In this case, Bertrand competition implies the worker
receives a starting wage equal to productivity.
135.2 Wages over time
Now consider the evolution of wages over the duration of a match. When k = 0, equation
(12) implies that the probability that the current employer remains a monopsonist decreases
over time. The outside option of the worker therefore improves and the ﬁrm must increase
wages to prevent the worker from visiting the job centre. Diﬀerentiation of (13) for k = 0
further establishes that
˙ w(t,0) = e
−φ(t) [φ
′(t)(r + µ + δ + φ
′(t)) − φ
′′(t)]
x − b
r + µ + δ + λ
> 0, (14)
for all t since φ′′(t) < 0.
On the other hand, for any k ≥ 1, equation (12) implies that the probability the current
employer becomes a monopsonist increases over time. When k = 1, the eventual destruction
of the vacancy left behind in the job centre outweighs the eﬀect of new vacancy turnover on
expected competition. The worker’s outside option and hence w(t,1) decreases with t, as
the threat of any potential loss brought about by an induced visit to the job centre increases
over time. Diﬀerentiating (13) for k = 1 shows that
˙ w(t,1) = −δe
−(δt+φ(t)) [(r + µ + 2δ + φ
′(t))(1 − φ(t)) + φ
′(t)]
x − b
r + µ + δ + λ
,
which is negative for all t if λ = δ.
Now suppose k ≥ 2. Diﬀerentiating (13) establishes that
˙ w(t,k) =
￿
δ
λ
￿k
φ(t)
k−2e
−φ(t)φ
′(t)
￿
φ
′(t)[[k − φ(t)]
2 − k] − φ(t)[k − φ(t)](r + µ + 2δ)
￿ x − b
r + µ + δ + λ
.
(15)
In this case, wages are not monotonic but exhibit a “humped” shape progression, increasing
and then decreasing as the employment relation evolves over time. This feature can be further
characterized for the special case where the arrival of projects equals the job destruction rate
in the job centre.
Proposition 2: For λ = δ, w(t,k) is strictly quasi-concave with respect to t for all k ≥ 2.
Proof: See Appendix
Quasi-concavity in this special case follows from the relative importance that P0(t,k)
and ˙ P0(t,k) have on (13) as t increases. As mentioned earlier, the former strictly increases
with t. However, the rate of change of this probability has a greater impact at early stages of
the employment relation. The ﬁrm must oﬀer higher wages to keep the worker from visiting
the job centre early on so that it can later reap the beneﬁts of a higher P0(t,k). Eventually
P0(t,k) settles towards its long run value. The impact of ˙ P0(t,k) diminishes and the worker
accepts lower wages to avoid a ﬁrm-induced visit to the job centre.
Although wages start and evolve very diﬀerently as the employment spell becomes long,
14all wages limit to the same value:
lim
t→∞
w(t,k) = x(1 − e
−λ/δ) < x. (16)
For any initial k, the birth and death process governing vacancy turnover implies that the
distribution of n converges to a unique distribution with a mean and variance equal to λ/δ
as t → ∞. History fades over time so that eventually all workers face the same prospects
in the job centre. Since the eﬀect of k is only transitory, wages converge to a unique wage,
w(∞) which increases with the expected number of vacancies in the job centre and converges
to x as λ → ∞.
5.3 Numerical examples
To further gauge the properties of the wage proﬁle, we calibrate the model to match salient
features of the US economy. The time period is one month. For expositional ease we focus
on k ∈ {0,1,2,5,10,20}.9 Following standard practice, r = 0.0041. We normalize the value
of productivity to x = 1 and let b = 0.4. Following Shimer (2005) λ = 0.45, which yields an
average unemployment duration of 2.2 months. We set δ = 0.02 to generate an average job
tenure of 50 months consistent with Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2007).
This parameterization generates a job-to-job transition rate consistent with the one re-
ported by Nagypal (2008).10 On the other hand, these parameters imply that the probability
after 50 months that a worker becomes unemployed following a separation is essentially zero.
For values of µ based on average working lives, the model is unable to generate suﬃcient
employment to unemployment transitions to be consistent with the data.11 The unemploy-
ment rate is too low. This limitation results from the constant returns to scale production
technology along with the matching mechanics. Workers do not crowd out each other, that
is turn over jobs, when they become employed. Job turnover in the job centre is the same as
the destruction rate of occupied jobs. This assumption seems natural in the context of the
model, but unemployment is unlikely given the above parameters. After a suﬃcient length
of time, jobs are likely to exist in a given market.
In contrast, the standard matching model adopts complete crowding out by assuming
one vacancy corresponds to one job and hence the turnover of vacancies depends directly on
the hiring of workers, not the job destruction process. Allowing for diﬀerent vacancy and
job turnover rates in this paper considerably complicates the analysis. The life of a market,
however, may not correspond to a worker’s entire period in the labor force. Individuals can
from time to time ﬁnd themselves displaced into unemployment and switching careers. As
9Numerical simulations with more values of k yield the same pattern as shown here.
10Nagypal (2008) estimates that the probability an employed worker experiences a job-to-job transition in
any given month is approximately 0.022.
11Consider a worker with k = 0 and t = 1/δ = 50. Since P0(t,k) is decreasing in k for all t, P0(1/δ,0)
gives an upper bound for the probability a worker becomes unemployed at 50 months following a separation
shock. Using the parameter values described above, P0(1/δ,0) = e−[λ/δ(1−e
−1)] = 0.0000006655.
15such, we set µ = 0.02 to match the average separation rate into unemployment reported in
Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2007).12 Using the unemployment rate from (18) derived
below, we obtain an average unemployment rate of 4.3%.13
Figure 1.a illustrates the wage dynamics for this parameterization. As implied by (14),
workers hired from unemployment (k = 0) are oﬀered a wage proﬁle that increases with
tenure. In this case, returns to tenure occur mostly within the ﬁrst year of employment. For
workers that were able to call a competitive auction (k ≥ 1), wages are essentially ﬂat and
equal to their productivity. In this case returns to tenure are nearly zero. This follows from
the degree of expected competition implied by the calibration. In particular, the ergodic
distribution of Pn(t,k) described by (2) implies an average number of vacancies in the job
centre of 22. Eﬀectively, the probability that the current employer becomes a monopsonist
in the future is zero and w(∞) = 1. In turn, (13) implies wages converge to this long run
value relatively quickly.
Figures 1.b and 1.c depict the wage dynamics for lower degrees of expected competition.
In particular, Figure 1.b considers a δ = 0.2. In this case (2) implies an average of 2 vacancies
in the job centre. Figure 1.c then considers the case in which δ = λ = 0.45. These ﬁgures
clearly show the impact of vacancy turnover and expected competition on the shape of the
wage proﬁles. As established and depicted in Figure 1.c, δ = λ yields wages that are strictly
increasing for k = 0, strictly decreasing for k = 1 and follow a humped, quasi-concave shape
at early stages of the employment relation for k ≥ 2. When k = 2, equation (15) implies
˙ w(0,2) > 0 and wages increase immediately after the match is formed. When k > 2, (15)
implies ˙ w(0,k) = 0 and wages stay closer to x for a longer period of time.14 In Figure 1.b,
on the other hand, wages resemble a combination of the patterns depicted in Figure 1.a and
1.c. For k = 1 wages fall below w(∞) for some period of time before rising back again to
achieve their stationary value. When k ≥ 2, (13), (15) and (16) together imply that wages
become ﬂatter and converge faster to x.
6 Individual Wages and Employment Dynamics
Although on-the-job search is practically free, Proposition 1 establishes that employed work-
ers will not visit the job centre until their current match is destroyed. As a result, job-to-job
and employment-to-unemployment transitions occur only through involuntary reallocations
arising from separation shocks. A worker who visits the job centre and encounters zero bid-
ders becomes unemployed. A realization of n ≥ 1, leads to immediate re-employment and
an apparent job-to-job transition.
12Generating employment to unemployment ﬂows in this way is consistent with many sequential search
models. Moreover, the shapes of the wage proﬁles shown in Figure 1 do not change if instead we set
µ = 0.00185 to match an average working lifetime of 45 years.
13The MATLAB codes are available from the following web site: http://www.le.ac.uk/ec/cct9
14This property follows from φ(t)k−2 in (15). The rate at which wages grow at initial stages of the
employment relation is inversely related to k.
16Recent empirical evidence supports the emphasis here on exogenous separation shocks
as a source of employment transitions. Fallick and Fleischman (2004), Nagypal (2005, 2008)
report that only a small fraction (less than 5 percent) of employed workers are actively
searching. Jolivet, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006) ﬁnd that “relative to involuntary mo-
bility (reallocation shocks and lay-oﬀs), voluntary mobility is a rather rare event” in many
European countries and in the US. Shimer (2007) and Ebrahimy and Shimer (2006) demon-
strate that a stock-ﬂow matching model with reallocation shocks is able to replicate cyclical
patterns of unemployment and vacancy time-series in the US economy.
Changes in wages accompany employment transitions. The immediate impact and any
subsequent wage growth following an employment transition depends on workers’ character-
istics as embodied in x and b, worker histories as given by t and k, and realized turnover
in the job centre. Transitions into unemployment, for example, always cause post displace-
ment earnings losses. A worker unable to obtain at least one suitable vacancy that ﬁts his
or her skill set becomes unemployed. Unemployed workers waiting in the job centre ﬁnd
employment only with monopsonistic ﬁrms and hence begin employment at w(0,0). Wages
subsequently increase over time, evolving according to w(t,0) until a new separation shock
arrives.15 Moreover, since (1) implies P0(t,k) is decreasing in k for all t ∈ (0,∞), a worker
starting employment with k = 0 will experience a higher probability of becoming unemployed
when a new separation shock arrives.
Two implications about wage and employment dynamics of workers that experience un-
employment spells arise. The ﬁrst implication is that displacement into unemployment
generates a transitory eﬀect on wages. There is an initial re-employment earning loss that
fades out with employment duration. As shown by Figure 1, the speed of this recovery
or the persistence of a displacement shock on earnings is govern by the turnover rates of
vacancies in the job centre.16 Second, a current spell of unemployment increases the prob-
ability of experiencing unemployment in the future. Since P0(t,0) is decreasing in t and λ,
the probability of becoming unemployed in the future is negatively related to the worker’s
employment duration and to the turnover of vacancies in the job centre. The overall eﬀect
of displacement on workers’ earnings and employment status histories depend on the rate
at which separations occur relative to the inﬂow of new vacancies. Since w(t,0) ≤ w(t,k),
it follows that for suﬃciently small values of λ/δ low pay and no pay outcomes can become
tied closely together in workers’ labour market histories. Low wage workers are more likely
to become unemployed and do not have enough time to recover from the initial displacement
15If unemployed workers did not search continuously, some would ﬁnd more than one job available at the
job centre in which case their wages would be considerably higher.
16There is a sizable literature that analyses the long-term earning losses of displaced workers. Focusing
primarily on the US economy, this literature argues that displacement has permanent eﬀects on earnings.
See Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993) for an early example. Bender and Von Wachter (2006) argue
that these studies overstate the earnings losses as these studies do not consider ﬁrm characteristics. Using
matched employer-employee data from Germany, they ﬁnd that initial post displacement earnings losses of
young workers fade after 5 years, a ﬁnding in line with our prediction that re-employment earnings losses
fade over time.
17shock. For larger values of λ/δ, the eﬀect of a displacement shock will tend to dissipate
relatively fast. By the time a new displacement shock arrives, a larger λ/δ implies that these
workers will be more likely to be immediately re-employed.17
Now consider a separation shock that leads to a reallocation into another job. In this
case, the initial wage in the next match can be lower or higher than the wage earned before
separation. Starting from low monopsony wages, w(t,0), job-to-job transitions will involve
an immediate wage increase provided a realization of n ≥ 2. An immediate wage decrease
follows when n = 1.18 Job-to-job wage transitions following on from employment with more
competitively determined wages can also rise or fall. Given the wage progressions described
earlier for k ≥ 1, job-to-job transitions can involve lower wages for not only workers with
any k who observe n = 1, but also for workers who observe n ≥ 2. Similarly, wage increases
following a separation shock can rise provided n ≥ 2.
Empirical evidence supports the proposed wage eﬀect of separation shocks. Involun-
tary separations that lead to job transitions with both wage increases and decreases are
widespread in many labour markets. Jolivet, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006) ﬁnd that “a
very substantial share (between 25% and 40%, with substantial variation across countries)
of job-to-job transitions are associated with wage cuts” whereas Connolly and Gottshack
(2008) show that taking a pay cut when switching jobs does not necessarily imply higher
wage growth in the future. That is, accepting a wage cut does not always improve a worker’s
position in the earning distribution, but reﬂects an adverse shock.
7 Wage Distribution
Wages vary over time and across individuals. To calculate the steady state wage distribution,
we ﬁrst derive the distribution of workers for all t and k. In what follows we normalize the
mass of workers to one. In a steady state, the total number of employed workers who observed
k vacancies in the job centre during their last visit, N(k), as well as the total number of
unemployed and employed workers are all constant over time.19
Let u denote the steady state number of unemployed workers and let n(t,k) denote the
proportion of employed workers that left k vacancies in the job centre and currently have an
employment spell t. Recall that a Poisson process with parameter µ governs the birth and
17Stewart (2008) ﬁnds evidence for low pay no pay cycles in the UK. Jolivet, Postel-Vinay Robin (2006)
suggest that the turnover rate, λ/δ, in the UK is four times smaller than in the US, whereas Heckman and
Borjas (1980) and Lynch (1989) do not ﬁnd evidence of state dependence in unemployment occurrence for
the US. The predictions of our model seem to ﬁnd empirical support.
18Wage cuts associated with job-to-job transitions are a somewhat diﬃcult feature to obtain from tradi-
tional equilibrium search models. Two notable exceptions are Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and Burdett
and Coles (2007).
19Analyzing the economy in a steady state does not imply assuming that wages are at their long tenure
value. These two are fundamentally diﬀerent concepts.
18death process of markets and hence workers. Since n(t,k) = n(0,k)e−(µ+δ)t, it follows that
N(t,k) = (1 − u)
Z t
0
n(τ,k)dτ = (1 − u)
n(0,k)
µ + δ
(1 − e
−(µ+δ)t), (17)
denotes the number of employed workers that left k vacancies and have an employment spell
no greater than t. By construction, in steady state N(∞,k) = N(k).
Stationarity implies that the inﬂow of workers into N(k) equals the outﬂow. Since outﬂow
is composed of those workers of type k that experienced separation and observed s  = k + 1
suitable vacancies, the number of workers that leave N(k) is
(1 − u)n(0,k)
Z ∞
0
(µ + δ[1 − Pk+1(t,k)])e
−(µ+δ)tdt.
On the other hand, the number of workers that enter N(k) is given by all those workers of
type s  = k that experienced a separation and found k + 1 suitable vacancies:
(1 − u)
X
s =k
n(0,s)
￿Z ∞
0
δPk+1(t,s)e
−(µ+δ)tdt
￿
.
Equating the last two expressions establishes a system of k simultaneous linear equations,
n(0,k) =
￿
1 −
Z ∞
0
δPk+1(t,s)e
−(µ+δ)tdt
￿−1 X
s =k
n(0,s)
Z ∞
0
δPk+1(t,s)e
−(µ+δ)tdt
for all k ≥ 0.
The number of unemployed workers in steady state is then given by
λu = (1 − u)
∞ X
s=0
n(0,s)
￿Z ∞
0
[µ + δP0(t,s)]e
−(µ+δ)tdt
￿
.
The inﬂow into unemployment comes from those workers in N(k) that experienced displace-
ment and did not ﬁnd a suitable job, whereas the outﬂow from unemployment consists of
those workers that found a suitable vacancy with probability λ. Solving for u gives
u =
P∞
s=0n(0,s)
￿R ∞
0 [µ + δP0(t,s)]e−(µ+δ)tdt
￿
λ +
P∞
s=0 n(0,s)
￿R ∞
0 [µ + δP0(t,s)]e−(µ+δ)tdt
￿. (18)
Using the solutions for n(0,k) for all k and (17) gives the solutions for N(k) for all k.
Turning to the steady state wage distribution, let G(w | k) describe the cumulative
distribution of workers with characteristic k and any t earning a wage no greater than w.
All employed (t,k) workers, (1 − u)n(t,k), earn wage w(t,k) as described by (13). Deﬁning
I(w(t,k) ≤ w) as an indicator function20 that takes the value of one if w(t,k) ≤ w and zero
20The indicator function is needed as wages are not necessarily monotone over t.
19otherwise, it follows that
G(w | k) =
1 − u
N(k)
Z ∞
0
n(t,k)I(w(t,k) ≤ w)dt
= (µ + δ)
Z ∞
0
e
−(µ+δ)tI(w(t,k) ≤ w)dt,
G(. | k) is constructed by comparing w with w(t,k) for each t and summing across workers
for which the indicator function is one.
Aggregating across k gives the unconditional steady state distribution of wages of the
economy,
G(w) =
1
1 − u
∞ X
k=0
G(w | k)N(k)
=
1
µ + δ
∞ X
k=0
G(w | k)n(0,k), (19)
where N(k)/(1−u) denotes the proportion of employed workers that left k vacancies in their
last visit to the job centre.
Figure 2.a, 2.b and 2.c show kernel estimates of the earnings density, dG(w), from sim-
ulated data of workers’ employment histories with the parameter values described earlier.21
The three densities shown here all exhibit an elusive property for search models with homo-
geneous agents - an interior mode with decreasing (for the most part) tails.22 As established
earlier, wages tend to converge to w(∞) relatively quickly, especially for those workers who
observed a large number of vacancies in the job centre during their last visit. As a result,
the model lies close to long term wages, w(∞). In addition, since workers face only three
starting wages, we observe positive density estimates around those points.
The ﬁgures further illustrate that as δ increases, the density becomes more skewed to the
right. Increasing the destruction rate of matches implies that workers visit the job centre
more often during their working lives. Since the initial k has only a transitory eﬀect and the
process governing vacancy turnover reaches its steady state relatively fast, when a visit to
the job centre takes place the worker is more likely to observe only one vacancy that suits his
or her skills. In turn, this generates a higher probability of observing a worker with k = 0
and starting wage w(0,0) and, hence, a greater mass in the left tail of the wage density. It
also raises the relative probability of observing a worker with k = 1 relative to a worker with
k > 1 making the spike in the right tail more prominent.
These wage densities can also be used to assess the amount of frictional wage disper-
21We simulated the data considering a sample of 10,000 workers. The vacancy turnover parameters are
set to λ = 0.45 and δ = {0.02,0.2,0.45}, and r,µ,x and b are as before.
22For example, in the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model, where employed and unemployed workers
search randomly for jobs and oﬀers arrive sequentially, the wage density is strictly increasing and convex
over the entire support. It is well known that adding ﬁrm heterogeneity to the Burdett and Mortensen’s
model produces a unimodal wage density with decreasing right tail.
20sion, as deﬁned by the dispersion that cannot be accounted for by workers’ observable and
unobservable characteristics. Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2007) use the ratio between
the average wage to the minimum observed wage (or reservation wage) to measure this type
of wage dispersion. They show that standard search models generate a mean-min (Mm)
ratio of 1.036, which is at least twenty time smaller than the observed Mm ratio in the US.
In our model, the respective Mm ratios generated by our model are 2.45, 2.24 and 1.89.23
As wages converge to w(∞) relatively fast and w(∞) increases with the rate of vacancy
turnover, λ/δ, in our model the Mm ratio becomes positively correlated with the amount of
expected competition in the job centre.24
8 Worker Heterogeneity
This section extends the model to include worker heterogeneity using the following structure.
Let α denote a worker’s ability and assume that the worker has productivity αx per unit
of time across all projects he or she can perform. When unemployed this worker receives
a payoﬀ αb per unit, where b ≥ 0 can be interpreted as productivity at home. Note that
α represents the amount of eﬃciency units of labour the worker supplies per unit of time
both at home production and at a ﬁrm. Let H(.) denote cumulative distribution of abilities
across the population of workers with support [α,α]. H is continuous and has density h > 0.
The expected gains to trade between a worker and ﬁrm now depend on α(x − b) rather
than on x − b. Since the worker is equally productive at all ﬁrms, a visit to the job centre
does not fundamentally change the market. The logic leading up to Proposition 1 continues
to hold. As in the homogeneous case, search is a wasteful activity. No-search wages for
workers of type α are then given by
w(t,k;α) = αx −
￿
δ
λ
￿k
φ(t)
ke
−φ(t)
￿
(r + µ + δ) −
φ′(t)
φ(t)
[k − φ(t)]
￿
α(x − b)
r + µ + δ + λ
,
for all t,k and α ∈ [α,α]. Wages described by w(t,k;α) have the same properties as w(t,k).
Since the same evolution of earnings applies, the diﬀerence is one of levels.
In the Appendix we show that the distribution of wages for each worker’s type, G(w;α)
is given by
G(w;α) =
∞ X
k=0
￿Z ∞
0
e
−(µ+δ)tI(w(t,k) ≤ w)dt
￿
n(0,k;α),
23Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2007) ﬁnd that the estimated average Mm ratios range from 1.46 to
1.98, depending on the data used. Our simulations produce slightly higher values. Increasing the value of b
generates smaller Mm ratios. For example setting b = 0.71 as in Hall and Milgrom (2007), the benchmark
calibration generates Mm = 1.41.
24When δ = 0.45, long term wages converge to w(∞) = 0.632; while the average wage paid is E(w) = 0.756.
When δ = 0.2, w(∞) = 0.895 and E(w) = 0.896; and when δ = 0.02, w(∞) = 1 and E(w) = 0.98. Given that
λ = 0.45 and w(0,0) = 0.4, the Mm ratio decreases with δ. Simulations show, however, that the variance
and the coeﬃcient of variation increase with δ and under these measures, frictional wage dispersion decreases
with expected competition in the job centre.
21where n(t,k;α) denotes the proportion of employed workers of type α that observed k va-
cancies and have an employment spell of t ≥ 0. The aggregate wage distribution is in turn
given by
G(w) =
Z α
α
G(w;α)h(α)dα.
We again simulate workers’ employment histories and use a kernel estimator to obtain
the wage distribution of the economy. Assuming that the distribution of workers’ abilities
follows a Gamma distribution with shape and scale parameter of 6 and 3.3, respectively,25
Figures 3.a, 3.b and 3.c replicate the estimates using the same parameter values as in the
homogeneous worker case. The wage densities have the same general properties as before.
Since wages paid are directly linked to a worker’s ability, however, introducing worker het-
erogeneity implies that the wage density closely follows the shape of the ability density. In
this sense, the model with worker heterogeneity can accommodate a wage density that is
more in-line with the unconditional empirical wage density.
9 Discussion
To gain further insight on wage determination under stock-ﬂow matching we compare our
wage mechanism to those found in two prominent models with on-the-job search, Burdett
and Mortensen (1998) and Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002).26 In the former model ﬁrms have
incomplete information about worker reservation wages. Firms post a single wage which
they maintain for as long as the worker remains employed in the ﬁrm. With homogeneous
agents the unique equilibrium yields a continuous wage oﬀer distribution and ineﬃcient job-
to-job transitions. In Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), ﬁrms have complete information about
their applicant reservation wages and are prepared to enter into a Bertrand bidding game
if an employee receives an outside oﬀer. Firms optimally hire workers at their minimum
acceptable wage and renegotiate the wage every time the worker receives a favorable outside
oﬀer. As in Burdett and Mortensen (1998), once the worker is paid a new wage, the ﬁrm
is not allowed to renege on this wage even though the ﬁrm has an incentive to do so. With
homogeneous agents, wages increase to marginal productivity as soon as the worker receive
an outside oﬀer and the worker is indiﬀerent between employment opportunities.
Our model is closer to Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002). Our workers can also renegotiate
their wages and are also indiﬀerent between employment opportunities. The ﬁrst important
diﬀerence, however, is that our wage determination mechanism takes into account the incen-
tives of both agents to renegotiate the wage at each point in time given their beliefs about
the degree of competition in the job centre. Our workers do not have to wait until an oﬀer
25Given the values of the shape and scale parameters the shape of h roughly resembles the shape of the
distribution of ex-ante worker heterogeneity estimated by Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002).
26In these models by assumption workers always search on the job. However, they allow variable search
intensity. See Mortensen (2003).
22arrives to renegotiate. They can at any time re-visit the job centre and induce an auction
between their current employer and the available vacancies found in job centre. At the same
time, ﬁrms can also induce renegotiation by oﬀering the worker w(0,0).
As in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), ﬁrms extract the entire gains to trade from the
unemployed by oﬀering a wage that makes them indiﬀerent between accepting employment
and continued search. Unlike Postel-Vinay and Robin, wages here subsequently increase
smoothly with tenure. The ﬁrm increases its wage oﬀer to outbid the evolving threat of
on-the-job search. Calibration suggests that when δ is suﬃciently low, wages paid to work-
ers hired from unemployment converge to marginal productivity and stay at that level in
subsequent jobs.
More generally, our model predicts that there is downward as well as upward wage mo-
bility within a ﬁrm. Models that allow a worker and a ﬁrm to credibly renegotiate every
time their outside options change also lead to this type of wage mobility within a ﬁrm. For
example, Postel-Vinay and Turon (2008) proposed a modiﬁed version of the Postel-Vinay
and Robin model that exhibits upward and downward wage mobility. In their framework
the existence of match-speciﬁc rents implies wages stay constant over a period of time before
increasing or decreasing. In contrast, as we let c → 0, any match-speciﬁc rents between
the ﬁrm and the employed worker dissipate. Wages are renegotiated at every point in time
because outside options are continuously changing.
Although empirical evidence suggests that such wage ﬂuctuations are not present when
analyzing workers’ average returns to tenure, evidence on the earnings process of workers
seem to suggest the presence of temporary shocks. In particular, McCurdy (1982), Abowd
and Card (1989) and Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), among others, have documented the
presence of permanent and transitory shocks by ﬁtting ARMA or ARCH models to earnings
data. It is usually assumed that these shocks arise from changes in worker productivity. Our
model suggests that temporary wage variation at early stages of the employment relationship
can be related to the interaction between reallocation shocks and the degree of competition
in the labour market at the moment at which the worker is hired. Moreover, with worker
heterogeneity, wages further reﬂect individual productivity diﬀerences as well as the state
of the aggregate economy. As such, wage dispersion and wage progression can be linked to
both the temporary and permanent shocks found in the error structure of longitudinal wage
regressions.
10 Conclusion
In the Burdett-Mortensen model with random matching, on-the-job search by workers re-
duces a ﬁrm’s monopsony power by introducing intertemporal competition. Firms optimally
respond to this competition by diﬀerentiating their wage policies. In contrast, this paper
adopts stock-ﬂow matching and consequently direct competition for workers. Here, search
23reveals all potential employment opportunities in a centralized marketplace and auctions
determine initial wages. If there is one bidder, low initial wages obtain. If there is more than
one bidder, higher Bertrand wages result.
In this framework, although on-the-job search by workers continues to generate the
prospect of intertemporal competition between ﬁrms, competition is not realized. The opti-
mal response by ﬁrms is to avoid direct competition by oﬀering wages that in eﬀect outbid
expectations in the marketplace. Wages evolve as the worker’s threat of on-the-job search
varies with anticipated turnover from the birth and death rates of outside employers. Po-
tential employers and hence bidders for the worker come and go in background. Given this
set-up, two key endogenous factors emerge - the bidding history from the last visit to the
market, represented above by k, and the degree of expected turnover of rival bidders, cap-
tured above through t. History fades over time so initially low wages rise with time whereas
higher wages gradually decay. Wages eventually converge to a common long term level.
Several results emerge that conform with empirical regularities.
• This framework provides a novel source of wage dispersion with the appealing feature
of an interior mode and prominent, well-behaved tails on both sides.
• The initial and expected threat of competition in the market determine the evolution
of wages within a ﬁrm and thereby introduce a novel way of understanding why ﬁrms
pay diﬀerent wages to similar workers.
• Unlike under random search, when a separation shock occurs, some workers ﬁnd jobs
immediately so that job-to-job transitions occur after a dismissal. Workers who ﬁnd
many bidders will often experience a wage rise from the ensuing bidding. The unlucky
who only have one suitor experience wage cuts.
• Workers dismissed from low wage jobs have poor job prospects and often wind up with
poor outcomes - unemployment or even lower wages. It can appear as if these workers
with bad histories are stuck in low-wage, no-wage cycles.
The focus in this paper is on workers as sellers, and on ﬁrms as buyers of labour services.
The framework and the results apply more broadly to other long term, repeated traders such
sales reps and purchasing agents; health care providers and patients; men and women in the
marriage market; and so on. It is sensible to investigate the patterns of trade in markets
with long standing traders to see how they conform with the results established here.
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27APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 2:
Let λ = δ and deﬁne
ϕ1(t,k) ≡ φ
′(t)[k(k − 3) + 2ke
−δt + φ(t)
2],
ϕ2(t,k) ≡ φ(t)[k − φ(t)](r + µ + 2δ).
In this case, (15) implies
˙ w(t,k) = φ(t)
k−2e
−φ(t)φ
′(t)[ϕ1(t,k) − ϕ2(t,k)]
x − b
r + µ + δ + λ
for all t and k ≥ 2, where φ(t) ∈ [0,1].
Note that ϕ1(t,k) > 0 and strictly decreasing for all t when k ≥ 3 and that ϕ2(t,k) > 0
and strictly increasing for all t when k ≥ 2. When k = 2,
ϕ1(t,2) = λe
−δt[(1 + e
−δt)
2 − 2],
and is strictly decreasing for all t, but ϕ1(t,2) > 0 only for those t < t′ = −1
δ ln(
√
2 − 1),
ϕ1(t′,2) = 0 and ϕ1(t,2) < 0, otherwise. Since ϕ1(0,k) = λk(k − 1) > 0 and ϕ2(0,k) =
0,continuity implies there exists a unique t∗(k) such that ϕ1(t∗(k),k) = ϕ2(t∗(k),k). Hence,
w(t,k) has a unique maximum at w(t∗(k),k) where
˙ w(t,k) > 0 for all t ∈ (0,t
∗(k))
˙ w(t,k) = 0 at t = t
∗(k)
˙ w(t,k) < 0 for all t > t
∗(k),
for all k ≥ 2. Moreover, note that ˙ w(0,2) > 0, ˙ w(0,k) = 0 for all k ≥ 3 and limt→∞ ˙ w(t,k) =
0 for all k ≥ 2.  
Derivation of the wage distribution with heterogeneous workers:
To obtain the steady state distribution of wages, let n(t,k;α) denote the proportion of
employed workers of type α that observed k vacancies and have an employment spell of
t ≥ 0. Using the same arguments as in (17), it follows that
N(t,k;α) = [h(α) − u(α)]
n(0,k;α)
µ + δ
(1 − e
−(µ+δ)t),
describes the number of employed workers of type α that left k vacancies and have an
employment spell no greater than t. In this case, u(α) denotes the steady state number of
unemployed workers of type α. In a steady state, N(∞,k;α) = N(k;α) is constant over
time. Equating the ﬂow of workers of type α that enter and leave this category we obtain a
28system of k simultaneous equations for each α ∈ [α,α] such that
n(0,k;α) =
￿
1 −
Z ∞
0
δPk+1(t,k)e
−(µ+δ)tdt
￿−1 X
s =k
n(0,s;α)
Z ∞
0
δPk+1(t,s)e
−(µ+δ)tdt
for all k ≥ 0, where n(0,k;α) describes its solutions. Integrating across α we obtain that
n(0,k) =
R α
α n(0,k;α)h(α)dα and hence N(k) =
R α
α N(k;α)h(α)dα. The steady state num-
ber of unemployed workers of type α is then given by
u(α) =
h(α)
P∞
s=0n(0,s;α)
￿R ∞
0 [µ + δP0(t,s)]e−(µ+δ)tdt
￿
λ +
P∞
s=0 n(0,s;α)
￿R ∞
0 [µ + δP0(t,s)]e−(µ+δ)tdt
￿ ,
where u =
R α
α u(α)dα.
Using the same arguments as before we obtain that the distribution of wages for each
worker’s type, G(w;α) is then given by
G(w;α) =
∞ X
k=0
￿Z ∞
0
e
−(µ+δ)tI(w(t,k) ≤ w)dt
￿
n(0,k;α),
and G(w) =
R α
α G(w;α)h(α)dα. 
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Figure 1: Within Firm Wage Dynamics
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Figure 2: Kernel Estimate of the Wage Density with Homogeneous Workers
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Figure 3: Kernel Estimate of the Wage Density with Heterogeneous Workers
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